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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the context of dynamic discrete decision models, the diﬀerence between the utilities of two choice al-
ternatives is not identiﬁed even when the discount factor and the distribution of unobservables are known
(see Rust, 1994, pp. 3125-3130). This result contrasts with the case of static discrete choice models, where
utility diﬀerences are identiﬁed and they can be used to evaluate behavioral responses to counterfactual
changes in the utility function. Although diﬀerences between conditional choice value functions are identi-
ﬁed in dynamic models (see Hotz and Miller, 1993, and Magnac and Thesmar, 2002), these value functions
cannot be used to evaluate the behavioral eﬀects of changes in one-period utilities. This paper shows the
nonparametric identiﬁcation of the diﬀerence between the value of choosing always the same alternative and
the value of deviating one period from this policy. We prove that, given these values, one can identify the
behavioral responses to policy interventions that modify one-period utilities.
2M o d e l
Time is discrete and indexed by t. At every period t an agent observes the vector of state variables st and
chooses an action at ∈ A = {1,2,...,J} to maximize the expected and discounted sum of current and future
utilities E
hP∞
j=0 βj U(at+j,s t+j) | at,s t
i
,w h e r eβ ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor, and U(at,s t) represents
the utility at period t. The agent has uncertainty on future values of state variables. His beliefs about future
states can be represented by a transition probability p(st+1|at,s t).T h e s e b e l i e f s a r e rational in the sense
that they are the true transition probabilities of the state variables. Let V (st) be the value function of this
problem. By Bellman principle of optimality this value function is the unique ﬁxed-point of the contraction
mapping:








The optimal decision rule α(st) is the arg maxa∈A of the term in brackets. From the point of view of the
observing researcher there are two types of state variables, st =( xt,ε t), where the vector xt is observable to
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1the econometrician and the vector εt is unobservable. The one-period utility is additive separable between
observable and unobservable variables: U(at,x t,ε t)=u(at,x t)+ε(at),w h e r eεt(a) is the a-th component
of the vector of unobservable state variables εt = {εt(a):a ∈ A}. We follow Rust (1994) and consider the
following assumptions on the joint distribution of the state variables.
ASSUMPTIONS: (1) The transition probability of the state variables factors as p(st+1|at,s t)=g(εt+1)
f(xt+1|at,x t);( 2 )g is the density of εt and it is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure
in RJ;a n d( 3 )xt has support X = {x(1),x (2),...,x (M)},w h e r eM is a ﬁnite integer.
Deﬁne the integrated value function S(xt) ≡
R
V (xt,ε t)g(dεt). Taking into account the Bellman equation











The right-hand side of this equation is a contraction mapping in the integrated value function, and therefore
S(.) is the unique ﬁxed point of this mapping (see Rust et al., 2002). Deﬁne also the integrated optimal de-
cision rules or optimal choice probabilities P(a|xt) ≡
R
I{α(xt,ε t)=a}g(dεt). Finally, deﬁne the conditional
choice value functions v(a,xt) ≡ u(a,xt)+β
P
x0∈X f(x0|xt,a) S(x0).
3 Nonparametric identiﬁcation of utilities
Suppose that there is a population of individuals who behave according to the previous model. We have
a random sample of n individuals from this population. In the sample we observe individuals’ decisions at
some period t, and observable state variables at periods t and t+1. We are interested in the nonparametric
estimation of the one-period utilities {u(a,x):a ∈ A,x ∈ X}. Given the time-homogeneous Markov
structure of the model and Assumptions (1) to (3), we can identify nonparametrically from these data
the choice probabilities {P(a|x):( a,x) ∈ A × X} and the transition probabilities {f(x0|x,a):( a,x,x0) ∈
A × X × X}.
The structure of the model implies two sets of restrictions on one-period utilities (see Magnac and
Thesmar, 2002). The ﬁrst set of restrictions comes from Hotz-Miller invertibility Proposition (Hotz and
Miller, 1993). This Proposition establishes that there is a one-to-one relationship between the vector of value
diﬀerences ˜ v(xt) ≡ {v(a,xt) − v(J,xt):a ∈ A−J} and the vector of choice probabilities P(xt) ≡ {P(a|xt):
a ∈ A−J},w h e r eA−J = {1,2,...,J− 1}.L e tQ(.) be this one-to-one mapping such that ˜ v(xt)=Q(P(xt)),
and let Q(a,P(xt)) be the a−th element of this mapping, such that v(a,xt)−v(J,xt)=Q(a,P(xt)).T a k i n g
into account the deﬁnition of v at the end of section 1, we can write these restrictions in matrix form as:
u(a) − u(J)+β (F(a) − F(J)) S = Q(a,P), (3)
where u(a) is a vector with the M utilities associated with alternative a; F(a) is the M × M matrix of
transition probabilities of x conditional to the choice of alternative a; S is the M ×1 vector with the values
S(x);a n dQ(a,P) is the M × 1 vector with values Q(a,P(x)). An important property of the mapping Q is
that it depends on the distribution of the unobservables but not on any other primitive of the model (i.e.,
discount factor, utilities and beliefs).
2The second set of restrictions comes from the integrated Bellman equation in (2). Taking into account
that E (maxa∈A v(a,xt)+εt(a)) =
P
a∈A Pr(a|xt) E (v(a,xt)+εt(a) | xt,α(st)=a), we can re-write this
Bellman equation in matrix form as:
S =
¡
I − β ¯ F
¢−1 (¯ u(P)+¯ e(P)) (4)
¯ F =
P
a∈A P(a) ∗ F(a) is the M × M matrix of unconditional transition probabilities, where P(a) is the
vector of choice probabilities {P(a|x):x ∈ X},a n d∗ is the element-by-element or Hadamard product.
¯ u(P)=
P
a∈A P(a) ∗ u(a) is the M × 1 vector of expected utilities. ¯ e(P)=
P
a∈A P(a) ∗ e(a,P) is the
M × 1 vector of expected epsilons, where e(a,P) is the vector {e(a,P(x)) : x ∈ X} and e(a,P(x)) ≡
E(εt(a)|xt = x,α(st)=a). A corollary of Hotz-Miller invertibility Proposition is that the conditional
expectations e(a,P(x)) depend on the set of choice probabilities P(x)={P(a|x):a ∈ A} and on the
distribution of the unobservables, but they not depend on the discount factor, utilities or beliefs.
If we solve expression (4) into equation (3), we get that for any a ∈ A, u(a) − u(J)+β (F(a) − F(J))
¡
I − β ¯ F
¢−1 (¯ u(P)+¯ e(P))=Q(a,P).T h i ss y s t e mo fM(J−1) equations represents all the restrictions that
the model imposes on one-period utilities. It is straightforward to show that, without further restrictions,
the utility diﬀerences {u(a)−u(J):a ∈ A−J} are not identiﬁed. Instead, we consider here the identiﬁcation
of the following set of value diﬀerences:
˜ u(a) ≡
n









In the right-hand-side of this expression, the second term in brackets is a vector with the expected present
values of choosing alternative J now and in the future. The ﬁrst term in brackets is a vector with the present
values of choosing alternative a today, and then choosing alternative J forever in the future. Therefore, ˜ u(a)
is the vector of values of deviating one period from the policy of choosing always alternative J.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that the discount factor and the distribution of unobservables are known. Then,
the values {˜ u(a):a ∈ A} are nonparametrically identiﬁed. For any a ∈ A:
˜ u(a)=Q(a,P) − β (F(a) − F(J))( I − βF (J))





a∈A P(a) ∗ Q(a).
Proof: If we multiply (element-by-element) the system of equations (3) by P(a),w es u mt h er e s u l to v e r
a,a n dw es o l v ef o r¯ u(P),w eh a v et h a t : ¯ u(P)=u(J)+ ¯ Q(P)+β (F(J) − F) S. Solving this expression
into (4), rearranging terms, and taking into account that (I − βF(J)) is a non-singular matrix, we get:
S =( I − βF (J))
−1 ¡
u(J)+ ¯ Q(P)+¯ e(P)
¢
. Solving this expression in (3) and taking into account that
I + βF(J)(I − βF(J))
−1 is equal to (I − βF(J))
−1, we get:
u(a) − u(J)+β (F(a) − F(J)) (I − βF (J))
−1 ¡
u(J)+ ¯ Q(P)+¯ e(P)
¢
= Q(a,P) (7)
Rearranging terms and using the deﬁnition of ˜ u(a), we obtain equation (6). The elements in the right hand
side of this equation depend only on the discount factor, the distribution of the unobservables, choice proba-
bilities, and transition probabilities. Therefore, under the conditions in the Proposition, ˜ u(a) is identiﬁed.¥
34 Counterfactual policy experiments
Proposition 2 shows that knowledge of the values {˜ u(a):a ∈ A} can be used to identify the behavioral
responses to policy interventions that modify one-period utilities.
PROPOSITION 2: Consider a policy intervention that modiﬁes one-period utilities such that utilities after
the intervention are u∗(a)=u(a)+d(a). Utility levels u(a) and u∗(a) are unknown, but the intervention
d(a) is known to the econometrician. Suppose that the discount factor, the distribution of unobservables,
and the values {˜ u(a):a ∈ A} are also known. Then, the (counterfactual) optimal choice probabilities after
the intervention, P∗ ≡ {P∗(a):a ∈ A}, are identiﬁed. More speciﬁcally, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of a














where 1{.} is the indicator function.
Proof: First, by deﬁnition:
˜ u∗(a)=˜ u(a)+
n









And it is clear from this expression that the values ˜ u∗(a) are known to the econometrician. Second, by
Proposition 1(a) in Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), the vector of choice probabilities P∗ is the unique ﬁxed










I − β ¯ F∗¢−1 (¯ u∗(P)+¯ e(P)) + ε(k)
´¾
g(dε) (10)
Taking into account that (see the proof of Proposition 1 above)
¡
I − β ¯ F∗¢−1 (¯ u∗(P∗)+¯ e(P∗)) = (I − βF(J))
−1
¡
u(J)+ ¯ Q(P∗)+¯ e(P∗)
¢
, it is straightforward to show that Ψ(P∗)=Φ(P∗). Therefore, the vector of optimal
choice probabilities P∗ is a ﬁxed point of the mapping Φ. It remains to show that P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point
of Φ. Suppose that Φ has two ﬁxed points, say P∗
1 and P∗
2. That would imply that there are two vectors of
values that solve the the integrated Bellman equation: i.e., S∗













. However, this is not possible because the integrated
Bellman equation is a contraction mapping. Therefore, P∗ is the unique ﬁxed point of Φ.
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